Conveners
Session 2: Field Trials and Measurements
- Steven Bell (NPL)
Within the nuclear security landscape, threats can exist within a variety of challenging environments. Developing the most appropriate procedure for a chaotic scenario can be difficult without having an appropriate model to work with, and uncertainty in the expected activity and shielding of a radioactive source can lead to sub-optimal containment and unnecessarily high irradiation.
Whilst...
Remote identification of buried or spatially distributed radioactive material is difficult because surface measurements mix natural background with any anthropogenic contribution. Activity may lie on the ground surface or be buried beneath sediment, and these geometries impose different attenuation and scattering effects that distort spectra. Burial depth suppresses photopeaks, hardens the...
The International Atomic Energy Association’s (IAEA) Network of Analytical Labs (NWAL) performs particle analyses from swipe samples for the monitoring of nuclear facilities and the radioactive material with two major focuses: detection of uranium bearing particles, and confirmation of declared enrichment.
Currently this analysis is carried out by large geometry secondary ion mass...
Accelerator Mass Spectrometry (AMS) is traditionally applied to radiocarbon dating, and cosmogenic nuclides but has the capability of analyzing lanthanides [1], [2]. Lanthanides prove difficult to measure via AMS due to their inherent contamination with each other and the isobar suppression limits of the system. This study aims to develop a sensitive technique for measuring lanthanides via...
