

Implementation of QKD protocols

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
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
QKD Summer School
Les Diablerets, 19 August 2026







Experimental setup for polarization-encoded BB84


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






Many more a lot more recent experiments!



Alice's key



Bob's key






Eve performs the following attack


non-destructive measurement of photon number

if $n \geq 2$: extract and keep one photon, perform delayed measurement

if not : block the signal and pretend a vacuum state









Original Quantum Cryptographic Apparatus built in 1989 transmitted information secretly over a distance of about 30 cm.


Sender's side produces very faint green light pulses of 4 different polarizations.

Quantum channel is an empty space about 30 cm long. There is no Eavesdropper, but if there were she would be detected.


Calcite prism separates polarizations. Photomultiplier tubes detect single photons.




(a)







(b)





F. Xu, X. Ma, Q. Zhang, H.-K. Lo, and J.-W. Pan, Secure quantum key distribution with realistic devices, Rev. Mod. Phys. 92, 025002 (2020)

Light is :	Discrete  Photons	Continuous  Wave
We want to know :	their Number & Coherence	its Amplitude & Phase (polar) its Quadratures X & P (cartesian)
We describe it with :	Density matrix $\rho_{n,m}$ 	Wigner function $W(X,P)$ 
We measure it by :	Counting: APD, VLPC, TES... 	Demodulating : Homodyne Detection  $V_1 - V_2 \propto X = X \cos \theta + P \sin \theta$
« Simple » States	Fock States	Gaussian States

Post processing



Key readily available

Complex error correction

Security

General attacks, finite-size,
side channels


General attacks, finite-size,
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
$$\{q_i, p_i, 1 \leq i \leq N\}$$

$$|\alpha\rangle_i = |q_i + ip_i\rangle$$


Gaussian, QPSK, QAM,...



Single (homodyne) or double (heterodyne) quadrature detection



Composable, finite size security proof for Gaussian modulation
Adapted to arbitrary discrete constellations at asymptotic limit



Performance of **point-to-point**, **prepare-and-measure** fibre-optic QKD systems

ED, H.-K. Lo, B. Qi, Z. Yuan, Practical challenges in quantum key distribution, npj Quantum Information 2, 16025 (2016)

At what **distance** can the secret key be generated?

Major difference with classical cryptographic systems: inherent limitation due to optical fiber loss

→ **QKD networks** and **satellite communication**




What is the right **topology** for the QKD network?

Can we accept prepare-and-measure schemes and **trusted nodes**?

Or do we need (some) **untrusted nodes**? (Semi) **device independence**?

Is it possible to ensure **upgradability** towards long-term quantum networks?

Definition of appropriate **network interfaces**



What is the right **satellite orbit and payload**?

LEO/MEO/GEO satellites differ vastly in terms of **geographic coverage**, **loss budget**, **requirements for pointing and tracking system**, **operation wavelength**

When are satellite constellations or nanosatellite technologies useful?

At what **rate** can the secret key be generated?

Important difference with classical systems: theoretical bounds for repeaterless links

→ **New protocols** and **multiplexing techniques**

What is the **security** status?

Composable security proof including **finite-size effects**

In terms of practical security, identification of **side channels** and countermeasures, crucial for **certification**

Complexity of classical **post-processing** techniques

When does it make sense to integrate with **Post-Quantum Cryptography**?


How **cost-effective** are the systems?

Compatibility with telecom network infrastructure → mutualized use important given the deployment cost

Dark or lit fibers

To what degree is it possible to use **photonic integration circuits** for scalability?

Maturity and **availability** of components



Y. Piétri et al., Optica Quantum 2024


Practical testbed deployment is crucial for
interoperability, maturity, network integration and control, synchronization, standardization of interfaces,
use case benchmarking, topology, upgradability

SECOQC QKD network, 2008


Swiss Quantum Network, 2011

Tokyo QKD network, 2015

China integrated terrestrial-satellite network



An operational integrated satellite and terrestrial system spanning the whole EU for ultra-secure exchange of cryptographic keys



Y.-A. Chen *et al.*, Nature 2021

From trusted nodes to end-to-end security and advanced quantum networking applications

Entanglement alleviates the need for trust in the nodes but quantum communication channels are **lossy** and **noisy**

- if we want to send a photon successfully, **trials increase exponentially with distance**
- even when the photon arrives, the **fidelity of the transmitted state** decreases exponentially with distance...



Why can't we use **amplifiers** like in classical communications?

Amplification introduces noise → loss of correlations

Quantum memory and repeater technologies enable interconnecting devices over long distances

A quantum memory must have **high storage-and-retrieval efficiency**, **high fidelity** and **long storage time**

A quantum repeater must guarantee a **good fidelity**, use **few resources**, tolerate **realistic operation and measurement errors**

Trade-offs in critical benchmarks (efficiency, storage time), entanglement rate, range,...

Target performance with multiplexing techniques: **repeater link with 50 bit/s over 50 km, >97% fidelity**

